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Introduction
On January 20, 2015, Frédéric Boisseau was buried in the village of Villiers-sous-Grez, 80 kilometers south of Paris. Boisseau, a 42-year-old maintenance worker, was shot dead in the lobby of the Charlie Hebdo building moments after two men armed with AK-47s burst through the front door. He was the first casualty in a series of terrorist attacks that left twenty people dead, including several members of Charlie Hebdo's editorial staff, four hostages at a kosher supermarket, three police officers, and the perpetrators themselves. In the widespread demonstrations that followed, millions took to the streets under the rallying cry "Je Suis Charlie" to mourn the loss of life and express solidarity with the French Republic. Yet as his brother Christophe bitterly observed, Boisseau's death was largely "forgotten," having been eclipsed by the others (qtd. in De Sakutin).
Speaking at Boisseau's funeral, Minister of Labor François Rebsamen acknowledged that the victims "did not [all] have the same notoriety" nor "receive the same media coverage." He insisted, however that "there is no hierarchy when it comes to suffering or tributes." All of the victims would be equally "mourned by the Republic," he continued, "because the Republic forgets nothing, forgets no one. The Republic does not distinguish between its children. She has only one child: the French people" ("Hommage à Frédéric Boisseau").
Contrary to Rebsamen's claims, this article contends that the Republic does in fact distinguish between its citizens and shows how the creation of a hierarchy of French subjects is predicated upon differential practices of mourning. It analyzes the discourses, ceremonies, and negotiations accompanying the funerals of both the victims and perpetrators to illustrate the different strategies of mourning that shaped the public and political memorialization of the Paris attacks. These strategies, which I refer to as erasure, inclusion-exclusion, and appropriation, were utilized by political actors in their efforts to manage the dead. By focusing on the funerals, I seek not only to highlight the political work of mourning, but also to demonstrate how the treatment of dead bodies is central to the construction of communal boundaries and political subjectivities.
The bodies of the dead have been a long-standing site of political activity and conflict in France. Up until the early 19 th century, burials were administered by the Catholic Church, which exercised considerable discretion in who it would bury. Pagans, heretics, suicides, criminals, actors and actresses, Protestants, Jews, and the excommunicated were all excluded from the "Christian ground" of the churchyards (Kselman) . 1 In the aftermath of the French Revolution, corpses of the old order became targets of political violence. As Michel Ragon recounts, when the National Convention voted for the destruction of the royal mausoleums of Saint-Denis on October 6, 1793, the skeletons of twenty-five kings, seventeen queens, and seventy-one princes were exhumed, thrown into two great ditches and covered with lime to destroy them. Their lead burial vaults were removed by workers with pick axes, melted down, and turned into bullets. The same year, the body of Cardinal Richelieu was taken out of its tomb and decapitated with much fanfare (Ragon) .
In addition to acts directed at the corpse itself, the dead can become politically charged through ritualized ceremonies such as funerals. Generally speaking, funerals are rites of passage that ease the dead out of this world and into the next (Hertz, Van Gennep) . They take many shapes depending on the character of the deceased and the circumstances behind their death. Like other public ceremonies such as civic festivals, funerals can be integrative and exclusive (Ozouf) . They help to integrate a community while simultaneously marking its boundaries and excluding others. They produce an array of affective responses, ranging from anger and sorrow to empathy and solidarity. Such affects, and the moments of mourning that engender them, can play a powerful role in political life by lending emotional weight to political claims, particularly those related to the identities and values of a political community. According to Bonnie Honig, "mourning practices postulate certain forms of collective life and so how we mourn is a deeply political issue" (10). I would add that it is not just how we mourn, but who we mourn (and do not mourn) that is of critical importance for political life.
Mourning practices are consequential for politics because they reveal who belongs and which lives matter in political communities. Judith Butler (2004 Butler ( , 2010 has observed that the uneven distribution of physical vulnerability and precarity regulates norms of grieving. In raising the question, "What makes for a grievable life?" Butler underscores the political calculations that render certain human lives more grievable than others. She writes "forms of racism instituted and active at the level of perception tend to produce iconic versions of populations who are eminently grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable" ("Frames of War" 24). Following Butler, we might define a grievable life as one whose loss is publicly recognized and collectively mourned.
Yet framing the issue solely in terms of which lives are grievable misses an important dimension of the politics of mourning. While Butler offers a powerful and compelling dichotomy--grievable versus ungrievable life--the funerals that will be analyzed here, particularly those of the three terrorists, show how the regulation of mourning targets not only the dead but also the living. Prohibitions on mourning attempt to circumscribe which individuals are worthy of mourning and which groups are allowed to mourn publicly. Mourning becomes politicized precisely because it can be mobilized to bolster or subvert state objectives. It can provide an official framework to interpret public loss and cultivate civic identities (Stow) , or conversely, help catalyze political resistance to the excesses of sovereign power. Groups that are "ungrievable" face restrictions on mourning when political authorities believe that they mourn incorrectly or for the wrong reasons. Such prohibitions seek to control not only the subjects of mourning but its content as well.
In a similar vein, Heather Pool suggests that social standing is created, contested, and confirmed in and through moments of political mourning. "For mourning to become political,"
she argues, "losses must be visible to the public" (188). In the wake of tragic events, the different ways that the dead are mourned (and not mourned) help clarify who has standing within the polity. "At its most fundamental level" argues Pool, "perhaps our sense of belonging is constructed through political mourning, when citizens see a loss as a loss..." (188). By studying rites of mourning then, we gain insight into the processes through which membership, social status, and belonging in political communities is affirmed or denied.
In what follows, I examine the different strategies of mourning employed in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris. I argue that these strategies produced a hierarchy of subject positions organized around a spectrum of grievability. Drawing on a variety of French and English language sources, including newspaper articles, interviews, and public speeches by political leaders, I show that at least three distinct forms of mourning were at work in the funeral ceremonies held for the perpetrators and victims of the attacks.
The first strategy, which I call "mourning as erasure," was characteristic of the funerals of the three terrorists and evinced an active effort to efface any trace of their memory, starting with their bodies. In my analysis of the funerals, I pay close attention to the political deliberations around the handling of the dead. Deciding where to bury the bodies entailed complex and difficult negotiations involving families and political actors at the local, national, and international levels.
That there should be some discussion about the proper burial location is perhaps unsurprising,
given the strong symbolic connections between the site of burial and a sense of individual and collective belonging (Balkan) . Yet the extent of the negotiations, particularly with regards to the bodies of the three terrorists and the victims of the supermarket attack, point to the degree to which states are invested in corpse management as a means of sovereign governance. Following other scholars, I view sovereignty as an effect of practices that target the body and adjudicate questions of life and death (Foucault, Stepputat) . Deliberations over the proper site of burial suggest not only that the bodies of the dead are a critical site for the enactment of sovereign power, but that the treatment of the dead is itself intimately linked to the construction of political subjectivities and communal boundaries.
Mourning as Erasure
On January 9, 2015, two days after attacking the offices of Charlie Hebdo, Saïd and The clandestine manner in which the terrorists were ultimately buried reflects efforts by the French state to disavow them by eradicating any trace of their memory.
Mourning as erasure entailed a series of exclusions targeting the terrorists' corpses.
According to newspaper accounts, French authorities initially sought to bury Coulibaly and the Kouachi brothers in Mali and Algeria respectively (Rousseau and Cadorel, "Algeria rejects").
The Algerian and Malian governments refused these requests on the grounds that the men were not citizens of either state. Although their parents had immigrated to France from Mali and Algeria, all three men were born and raised in France and held French citizenship. Furthermore, as Algeria's Foreign Minister Ramantane Lamamra pointed out, the Kouachi brothers had "never set foot in Algeria" (qtd. in "Algeria rejects").
The French state's desire to export the bodies suggests that it wanted to avoid the symbolic pollution stemming from the burial of terrorists in its territory. More importantly, this move can be understood as an attempt to re-write the personal biographies of the three gunmen to divest them of any connection to France and obscure their legal and political status as French citizens. In effect, it was an attempt to de-naturalize them posthumously. Such efforts reveal a kind of genealogical racism which assumes that the children of immigrants are perpetually linked to the ancestral homelands of their parents and grandparents, thereby remaining outsiders in the show how the political threat posed by Kouachi's grave was not simply a matter of his grievability. Although Kouachi could be accurately described as an "ungrievable life," the danger was that he would be mourned improperly, by the wrong type of people, and for the wrong reasons. Robinet assumes that the terrorist would become a martyr and that his grave would serve as a site of pilgrimage for 'fanatics.' As such, Robinet's effort to deny Kouachi a burial plot is a strategy of erasure enacted as a prohibition of mourning.
Patrice Leclerc, a member of the French Communist Party (PCF) and mayor of Gennevilliers, where Chérif Kouachi had lived for several years, also expressed reservation about the prospect of his burial in the city. Although Leclerc successfully blocked a request from Saïd's widow to bury both brothers together on the grounds that Saïd had not been a resident of Gennevilliers, he was compelled to proceed with Chérif's burial. "I didn't have a choice" he explained, "like all mayors, I would prefer to avoid burying a terrorist in my territory, but I applied the law" (qtd. in "Saïd Kouachi enterré"). Another city official, whose name was not disclosed because he was not authorized to speak publicly about the burial, said that "even if it doesn't please us, we respect French law" (qtd. in de la Baume).
While French burial law grants citizens the right to be buried in the district where they lived or died, it also provides the mayor of the city with some discretion over how and when the burial will take place. The method by which the gunmen were buried is instructive. The Kouachi brothers were both interred in the middle of the night under the cover of darkness in anonymous, unmarked graves. No family members were present and the locations of the cemeteries and gravesites were not disclosed to the public. Describing the burial of Saïd, mayor Robinet said that it occurred "in the most discrete, anonymous way possible" in order to avoid the possibility of the grave becoming a "shrine for certain types of people" (qtd. in "Saïd Kouachi enterré").
Similarly, mayor Leclerc said that Chérif's grave would remain anonymous "to prevent any threat to public order and to preserve the tranquility of the city" (qtd. in "Chérif Kouachi").
As for Coulibaly, although his last known residence was with his girlfriend Hayat
Boumeddienne in Fontenay-aux-Roses, the municipality was not obliged to take his corpse since the couple was not married. Asked about the possibility that he would be buried in Fontenayaux-Roses, its mayor Laurent Vastel suggested that that the bodies of terrorists should be subjected to "mandatory cremation" to prevent their graves from becoming "unhealthy sites of pilgrimage" (qtd. in Saliceti). While Vastel's proposal was not carried through, Coulibaly was buried secretly and anonymously, much like the Kouachi brothers. His body was interred in an unmarked grave in the Muslim section of a cemetery near the Paris Orly airport at six in the morning under tight police security (Gauron) .
These accounts highlight the multiple ways that different political actors were invested in controlling the corpses of the gunmen, and by extension, shaping the conditions of their memorialization. At each step, French authorities utilized different strategies of erasure as a means of regulation. Attempts to export the corpses and to obstruct their burial in France were moves that erased the gunmen's citizenship and legal status, while the decision to bury them in unmarked graves was an erasure of their personhood and memory. Strategies that render certain subjects invisible are constitutive of sovereign power. Describing the practice of enforced disappearance, Banu Bargu argues that it is a specific form of violence that seeks not only to eradicate the person whom it targets, but also to "erase the fact that the person ever existed" (43).
The corpses of the three terrorists were not only hidden from sight, but more importantly, the act of anonymous burial was deployed as a means to foreclose the very possibility of mourning. My point is not that the terrorists deserve to be memorialized or celebrated--they do not--but that the negotiations surrounding their burial demonstrates how the constitution of political boundaries is intimately linked to the management of dead bodies. Efforts to export their corpses are akin to posthumous denaturalization and reflect attempts to excise the terrorists from the French nation--both literally and symbolically.
Mourning as exclusionary inclusion
In contrast to the inconspicuous burials of the three gunmen, the funerals held for the three police officers killed in the attacks were major political spectacles. In a speech delivered at the ceremony, Hollande praised the officers for their courage, declaring that they "died so that we could live in freedom" ("Hommage aux victimes"). He also underscored their family histories, noting that "they represented the diversity of origins of the forces of order in our country." Their biographies not only set the tenor of the speeches made in their honor but also structured the ways in which they were mourned and incorporated into the Muslim, police, immigrant), framed the public mourning of Merabet and reflected a strategy of exclusionary-inclusion. He was described by the press as a "bridge-builder" (Sage) with "one foot in the banlieue and the other in the police," (Fikri) and eulogized by Hollande as being "very proud to represent the French Republic" ("Hommage aux victimes"). In his speech, Hollande also contended that "Ahmed Merabet knew better than anyone that radical Islam has nothing to do with Islam and that fanaticism kills Muslims" (ibid). where the constant need to affirm their citizenship undermines their claim to equal membership in the French polity. To put it differently, there would be no need for French Muslims to proclaim their status as citizens or for others to confirm their citizenship if they were already accepted as full members of the body politic. As Mayanthi Fernando has observed, "the more they assert their Frenchness, the more they reveal the precariousness of their belonging" (65).
Thus, while the public commemoration of Merabet's service could be read as a moment of political inclusion, the manner in which his biography is folded into a larger narrative of collective mourning reproduces a vision of the French nation where ethnic and religious minorities remain outside of the dominant national imaginary.
The choice of Merabet's burial site also deserves some scrutiny. To begin with, it was never in doubt that he would be buried in France. Unlike the three terrorists, there was no attempt to deport his body to his purported ancestral homeland. In a sense, Merabet's burial in
France was a testament to his belonging. More telling however, was the decision to bury him in the Muslim Cemetery of Bobigny, which has a unique place in the history of French colonialism.
The cemetery, which is one of the oldest Muslim burial grounds in France, was established in Israeli political leaders used the funeral as an occasion to encourage Jewish migration to Israel, claiming that Israel was their one and only homeland. As such, the victims were appropriated in the service of political projects aimed at consolidating the boundaries of two different national communities.
The appropriation began before the victims' bodies arrived in Israel. Speaking at a rally held in Paris on January 11, Prime Minister Netanyahu said "I wish to tell to all French and European Jews--Israel is your home" (qtd. in Booth and Eglash). His comments invoked the idea of a Jewish homeland to make the claim that European Jews belonged in Israel and to encourage them to come 'home.' But the actual process of 'return,' at least with the four victims, was ad-hoc, provisional, and beset with inconsistencies. While the burial of Israeli citizens is subsidized by the state through Israel's National Insurance Institute, foreign nationals who wish to bury a family member in the country are required to pay for the full cost of a cemetery plot, which in Jerusalem start around NIS 90,000 ($23,500). The families were initially offered plots in the Mount of Olives cemetery in East Jerusalem at a cost of 15,000 Euros per grave, but this site was rejected because of security concerns for the VIPs who would be present at the funeral (Hasson) . They were then approached by a businesswoman who offered to donate four plots in a multi-tiered grave in her private plot at the Har HaMenuchot cemetery, but this location was ruled out because of problems with legal permits. Finally, they were offered individual graves at Har HaMenuchot at a reduced cost of NIS 50,000 ($12,700). After a day of internal discussion and negotiation, Minister for Religious Services Naftali Bennett announced that his office would absorb the costs of the burial plots (Sharon) . These negotiations highlight the contradictions in the lofty rhetoric of homecoming and the provisional support that return processes receive in practice.
The funerals offered an emotional platform for Israeli politicians to address their supporters both at home and abroad. In messages delivered by senior political figures, the dead were instrumentalized to buttress appeals for members of the Jewish diaspora to immigrate to Israel. Netanyahu elaborated on the points he had made in Paris during his speech at the funeral, asserting that "Jews have the right to live in many countries, and it is their right to live in perfect safety, but I believe that they know deep down in their hearts that they have only one country, the state of Israel, that will accept them with open arms, like beloved children" (qtd. in Rudoren).
He added, "Today, more than ever, Israel is our true home, and the more numerous we are, the more united we are in our country, the stronger we are in our one and only state" (ibid). President
Rivlin echoed Netenyahu's comments and addressed the victims directly. "Yohav, Yohan, Philippe, Francois-Michel, this is not how we wanted to welcome you to Israel" he said. "This is not how we wanted you to arrive in the Land of Israel, this is not how we wanted to see you come home... We wanted you alive, we wanted for you, life" (qtd. in Dvorin and Kempinski).
Rivlin also encouraged French Jews to make Aliyah, declaring that "Our land is your land, our homes are your homes" (ibid).
While Israeli politicians used the funeral as an occasion to encourage Jewish emigration from France and elsewhere, their French counterparts were adamantly opposed to the idea and insisted that such out-migration would be a blow to the founding principles of the Republic.
Speaking at the funeral ceremony in Jerusalem, Ségolène Royal noted that "France is proud to hold the largest population of Jews in Europe" and that "there is no room for anti-semitism in
France" (qtd. in Booth and Eglash). Prime Minister Valls went further, asserting that "If 100,000
people of Spanish origin were to leave, I would never say that France is not France anymore. But if 100,000 Jews leave, France will no longer be France. The French Republic will be judged a failure" (qtd. in Goldberg).
Although their aims were different, both governments appropriated the dead to advance claims about the contours of the nation-state. Mourned as victims of anti-semitic terrorism, the four men killed at the Hyper Cacher supermarket engendered a passionate debate over the place of Jews in contemporary France. While Israeli political figures read the attacks in terms of an ongoing security threat whose solution entailed systematic immigration to Israel, French officials made strong statements to assure French Jews that they had always been and would forever remain an integral part of the Republic. As such, the dead were central to the articulation of a particular vision of political community and its natural demos.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, four million people took to the streets to participate As this article has shown, the political positioning of the dead depends not only on symbolic rituals and ceremonies, but is in a very material sense, determined by the treatment of their physical remains. The materiality of a dead body is critical to its political efficacy. This is because corpses can be moved around, strategically displayed or hidden from sight, and can be used to physically ground political claims (Verdery) . In the case of the three terrorists, efforts to These measures point to the ways that a politics of mourning can be exploited to serve reactionary projects aimed at consolidating the regulatory and policing powers of the state. They reflect a troubling trend wherein security concerns are invoked to justify the expansion of executive powers and the surveillance of large segments of the populace. By delimiting which subjects are included, excluded, or marked as a threat to the integrity of the political community, mourning practices are critical sites for the enactment and contestation of sovereign power. In the wake of tragic losses, a politics of mourning must resist being co-opted in efforts that seek to restrict democratic rights and freedoms in the name of security. The availability of burial grounds for Muslims in France is circumscribed by two important laws--the Napoleonic Decree of 1804, which abolished confessional cemeteries and the Law of November 14, 1881, which prohibits the construction of separate confessional parcels (les carrés confessionels) in municipal cemeteries. The Law of 1881 was part of a series of measures that were undertaken to ensure "neutrality" and "nondiscrimination" within the cemetery. In spite of these regulations, around 75 Muslim sections have been established in municipal cemeteries in France, yet Bobigny remains the only cemetery that is exclusively for Muslim burials. See van den Breemer and Maussen, and Ural.
